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Abstract—It is commonly agreed that highly parallel software
on Exascale computers will suffer from many more runtime
failures due to the decreasing trend in the mean time to
failures (MTTF). Therefore, it is not surprising that a lot of
research is going on in the area of fault tolerance and fault
mitigation. Applications should survive a failure and/or be able
to recover with minimal cost. MPI is not yet very mature
in handling failures, the User-Level Failure Mitigation (ULFM)
proposal being currently the most promising approach is still in
its prototype phase.
In our work we use GASPI, which is a relatively new
communication library based on the PGAS model. It provides the
missing features to allow the design of fault-tolerant applications.
Instead of introducing algorithm-based fault tolerance in its true
sense, we demonstrate how we can build on (existing) clever
checkpointing and extend applications to allow integrate a low
cost fault detection mechanism and, if necessary, recover the
application on the fly. The aspects of process management, the
restoration of groups and the recovery mechanism is presented
in detail. We use a sparse matrix vector multiplication based
application to perform the analysis of the overhead introduced
by such modifications. Our fault detection mechanism causes no
overhead in failure-free cases, whereas in case of failure(s), the
failure detection and recovery cost is of reasonably acceptable
order and shows good scalability.
Keywords: GASPI; GPI; fault detection; fault recovery/tol-
erance; checkpoint-restart; pre-allocated spare processes
I. INTRODUCTION
The advances in computational capacity of HPC clusters
have enabled many fields in research and industry to progress
far beyond imagination. Still the demand of more computa-
tional capacity is never ending. In the recent past, the consis-
tent exponential growth is achieved with the help of extreme
levels of hardware parallelism. This causes a severe reduction
in mean time to failure (MTTF) of the overall systems and
is visible with every new generation of large clusters. For
example, the ‘Intrepid’ BlueGene/P system (debuted as # 4
on the top500 list of June 2008 [1], installed at the Aragonne
National Laboratory) is reported to have the MTTF of 7.5 days
[2]. In contrast, a more recent BlueGene/Q cluster ‘Sequoia’
(debuted as # 3 according to Nov. 2013 list, installed at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) has a node failure
rate of 1.25 per day [3]. On the way to exascale machines, the
MTTF is expected to reduce to the order of hours or minutes
[4], [5]. This indicates an alarming behavior which, if not taken
care of, will question the usability of clusters at exascale.
In HPC systems, programs can face many kinds of failures
during runtime, e.g., hardware and software faults, silent
errors, Byzantine failures, etc. According to [6], 60% of all
failures are attributed to either memory or CPU failures. Such
failures, in addition to others, eventually lead to process or
node-level failures, which are the focus of this work. The
Majority of the literature regarding fault tolerance towards
fail-stop failures falls into either one or a combination of
the following four categories: algorithm based fault toler-
ance (ABFT), checkpoint/restart (C/R), message logging, and
redundancy [7].
So far most algorithms (and underlying communication
models) are built under a comprehensible assumption that the
communication partners of every process stay alive and func-
tional during the entire run of the program. Consequently, the
failure of even a single process leads to the failure of the whole
application. For large scale applications, it is beneficial to drop
this assumption. This would mean that the program should
continue to run even after the failure of a certain amount of
processes, i.e., node failures. This opens a new dimension
of research in the field of fault tolerance. In this context,
the first step is to build/utilize a communication library that
can provide the necessary supporting functionalities for this
purpose, i.e., health information of processes, failure detection
mechanisms, propagation of failure information to all relevant
processes, etc. During the development of MPI 3.0, efforts
were underway to introduce process-level failure tolerance [8],
but were not eventually successful. The fault tolerant working
group in the MPI forum is currently working on the User-Level
Failure Mitigation (ULFM) standard proposal and its prototype
implementation (based on OpenMPI) for its potential inclusion
in the MPI 3.1 standard [9]. Despite the apparent attractiveness
of this new approach, it comes with a new set of challenges,
i.e., correct and consistent failure acknowledgment, rebuilding
communication infrastructure, recovering lost data from failed
process(es), etc. These building blocks require extra effort and
caution during application development stages.
In this work, we use the GPI-2 [10] implementation of the
GASPI specification [11] to build a fault tolerant application
that is capable of recovering dynamically from process fail-
ures.
The main contributions of our work are as follows:
1) Design and implementation of the fault detection (FD)
mechanism to detect fail-stop failures in parallel appli-
2cations. The recovery mechanism is then implemented,
which includes the repairing of broken communication
infrastructure and the recovery of the lost data of the
failed processes.
2) The FD mechanism is applied to a sparse matrix vec-
tor multiplication (spMVM) based application, namely
Lanczos eigensolver, to showcase its real usage. The
necessary algorithmic restructuring is presented in detail.
The changes in the underlying spMVM library are also
highlighted.
3) For recovering the data of the failed processes, the
application-level C/R approach is used. Despite the
criticism it faces, the recent neighbor node-level C/R
optimizations [12], [13] have enabled it to be a good
candidate on future exascale systems [4]. We have
implemented a neighbor node-level C/R library for GPI-
2 applications. In case of a node failure, the neighboring
nodes are bound to change, thus the C/R library is also
made fault aware.
4) A benchmark study has been performed to analyse
the overheads involved in this fault tolerance approach.
This includes a range of application runtime cases, i.e.,
overhead in failure-free case and overhead with 1,2,3
failure recoveries, etc. Moreover, the scalibility of the
fault detection method is tested with up to 256 nodes.
With this practice, we have developed a fault tolerant
application which can heal itself dynamically after the loss
of one or more processes. Thus the time for restarting the job
manually and wait-time spent in the queueing system for a
new job request are avoided. The concept can be applied to
other applications with different communication libraries as
well when they support fault tolerance. We think that this is a
good starting point to gain experience and become aware of the
challenges involved and their potential solutions for utilization
of such fault tolerant communication libraries.
The paper follows the following structure. Some preliminary
definitions and concepts are described in Sect. II. In Sect.
III, the GASPI communication interface is briefly introduced
along with its fault tolerance features. The design and imple-
mentation of our fault tolerance method along with the fault
detection mechanism are described in Sect. IV. Section V in-
troduces the benchmark environment and provides application
specific details for benchmarks. The overhead analysis of our
implementation is presented with benchmarks in Sect. VI. A
brief summary of the related work is described in Sect. VII.
We conclude the paper in Sect. VIII with a short discussion
about the challenges of such a fault tolerance approach and
possible improvements.
II. PRELIMINARIES
There are three central components in application-driven
fault tolerance. In this paper, we use the term ‘application-
driven’ fault tolerance for an approach where an application
can heal itself dynamically despite one or more process fail-
ures. The first and foremost component is to have a consistent,
accurate and reliable failure detection mechanism. Design and
implementation of a fault detector for asynchronous systems
is a complex task. A distributed system is termed as ‘asyn-
chronous’ if there is no upper bound on message transmission
delays and process execution time, and all real HPC systems
fall into this category. There are two basic properties of a fault
detector [14]: 1) Completeness: The crashed processes are
suspected by some healthy processes, after a certain amount
of time. A strong completeness implies that every failed
process is eventually detected by every healthy process. 2)
Accuracy: Every detected failure corresponds to a crashed
process (no false-positives). The complete satisfaction of both
these properties is theoretically impossible [14]. Thus most
FD implementations are willing to tolerate some level of
inaccuracy but require strong completeness.
The implementation of ULFM relies on detection of faults
based on the communication failure between processes. After
a failed process is detected, the user can revoke the rest of the
communication in a communicator and propagate the failure
information about failed processes using ULFM functions. In
this work, we choose a different approach where an explicit
fault detector monitors the health of every other process. Due
to the PGAS nature of communication in GASPI, this brings
certain advantages in terms of developing consensus between
processes after failure(s) and incurs no overhead in the failure-
free case (discussed in detail in Sect. IV).
After a correct failure detection, the second step involves the
selection of a communication reconstruction and domain redis-
tribution strategy. There can be two approaches in this context
[15]. 1) Shrinking recovery: In this method, the application
proceeds with the rest of available processes after failure(s)
and requires redistribution of domain. 2) Non-shrinking recov-
ery: This method involves using new process(es) to replace the
failed one(s), where the work distribution of the application is
not changed after failures. Depending on the application and
the communication library, either of these techniques can be
beneficial. In our work, we have used a non-shrinking recovery
method.
The third stage involves the data recovery of the lost
process(es) and continuing further computation. Data recovery
can either be done by reading a checkpoint or by using an
algorithm based fault tolerance (ABFT) approach. An ABFT
approach is by nature highly algorithm-specific and cannot be
generalized; therefore, we have opted for application specific
node-level C/R approach in our application.
III. INTRODUCTION TO GASPI AND GPI-2
GASPI is a communication library for C/C++ and Fortran.
It is based on a PGAS style communication model where
each process owns a partition of a globally accessible memory
space. GPI-2, the GASPI implementation, takes full advantage
of the hardware capability to perform remote direct memory
access (RDMA). More importantly, there is a focus on pro-
viding truly asynchronous communication to overlap compu-
tation and communication, and on thread-safe communication
which allows multi-threaded applications with a fine-grained
communication and asynchronous execution capability.
GASPI defines a very compact API consisting of one-
sided communication routines, passive communication, global
3atomics and collective operations. It also defines groups which
are similar to MPI communicators and are used in collective
operations. Furthermore, there is the concept of segments.
Segments are contiguous blocks of memory and can be made
accessible (to read and write) to all threads on all ranks of a
GASPI program. Data to be communicated is thus placed in
such segments.
Given the aforementioned increasing need for fault tolerant
applications, GASPI was designed with that in mind. It sup-
ports application-driven fault tolerance on the process level.
This means that the failure of a single process does not cause
the entire program to fail. The program can in fact react to the
failure and try to recover by “healing itself”. This is achieved
with two simple concepts: timeouts and an error state vector.
GASPI provides a timeout mechanism to all potentially
blocking procedures. The user provides a timeout (in millisec-
onds) and the procedure returns after that time if it could not
successfully complete. Furthermore, since a timeout does not
necessarily imply an error or failure from the remote part,
GASPI provides an error state vector that holds the state of
processes. The state vector is set after every erroneous, non-
local operation and can be used to detect failures on remote
processes. Currently, each rank can either have a state of
GASPI STATE HEALTHY or GASPI STATE CORRUPT.
This error state vector can be queried by the application using
gaspi state vec get to determine the state of a remote partner
in case of timeout or error.
Along with the previous mechanisms, for the context of
our work, we have extended GPI-2 to provide an extra
mechanism (not included in the GASPI specification) for fault-
tolerant applications. The procedure gaspi proc ping tests the
availability of a particular GPI-2 rank. As the name indicates,
a ping message is sent to a particular process. In case a
problem is detected, a GASPI ERROR is returned to which
the application can react.
In the next sections, we describe our technique in more
detail.
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
This section explains the details of our fault detector (FD),
its implementation in the algorithm, and the data recovery
technique for our implementation. The basic idea behind
our implementation is to designate some processes as ‘idle
processes’ at the start of the computation to facilitate non-
shrinking recovery. The remaining processes form the ‘worker
group’ and do computation. The idle processes serves two
purposes. One of the pre-determined idle processes serves as
a failure detector process. The rest of the idle processes stay
idle until FD detects a failure and asks idle process(es) to act
as rescue process(es) and join the worker group.
A. Failure Detection and Acknowledgment
Our fault detection method relies on a dedicated FD process
periodically checking the health (i.e., aliveness) of all other
processes. The FD process pings every other process via
gaspi proc ping() and checks for its return value as shown
in Listing 1. A successful completion (i.e., return value of
i n t g l o h e a l t h c h k ( g a s p i r a n k t ∗ f a i l e d p r o c l i s t ,
g a s p i r a n k t ∗ r e s c u e p r o c l i s t , g a s p i r a n k t
∗ a v o i d l i s t ){
i n t comm sta te = WORKING;
g a s p i r e t u r n t r e t v a l ;
f o r ( i n t rem id =0 ; rem id<numprocs ( ) ; ++ rem id ){
i f ( a v o i d l i s t [ rem id ] != 1){ / / p r o t e c t s mes s ag ing
a l r e a d y d i s c o v e r e d f a i l e d p r o c e s s e s
r e t v a l = g a s p i p r o c p i n g ( rem id , GASPI BLOCK) ;
}
i f ( r e t v a l == GASPI ERROR ){
a v o i d l i s t [ rem id ] = 1 ;
comm sta te = BROKEN;
}
}
/ / i n f o r m i n g a l l h e a l t h y p r o c e s s e s abou t f a i l e d
p r o c e s s e s and t h e i r r e s c u e p r o c e s s e s .
i f ( comm sta te == BROKEN){
m a k e f a i l e d a n d s e c u e p r o c l i s t ( f a i l e d p r o c l i s t ,
r e s c u e p r o c l i s t ) ;
r e p o r t h e a l t h y p r o c e s s e s a b o u t f a i l u r e ( f a i l e d p r o c l i s t
, r e s c u e p r o c l i s t ) ;
}
r e t u r n comm sta te ;
}
Listing 1: The global health check routine. The fault detector
process periodically checks the health of all healthy processes.
GASPI SUCCESS) of the ping operation implies a healthy
process. Figure 1a shows the schematic diagram of such one-
sided ping based fault-detection. A rational ping frequency can
be set by the user depending on the number of processes. After
completion of a single cycle around all healthy processes, the
FD has an updated global health view. We rely on the fact
that each fail-stop failure eventually results in breakage of the
communication channel between the FD and the failed process.
This consequently leads to the return of ping operation with
GASPI ERROR (shown in Fig. 1b). After detection of failed
process(es), the FD process informs all healthy processes about
the failed processes as well as their corresponding rescue
processes. This is done via one-sided write in the global
memory of all healthy processes. Meanwhile, the worker
processes communicating directly with the failed processes
keep on returning with GASPI TIMEOUT unless a failure
acknowledgment is received. The remaining healthy working
processes continue with their work until they also receive a
failure acknowledgment signal from the FD process. After
failure acknowledgments, no further regular application com-
munication is performed and processes enter the recovery stage
of the algorithm. A threaded implementation of the FD process
enables it to monitor the health state of multiple processes
simultaneously. For exascale systems, multiple FDs can be
used to distribute the health check scan of all processes.
a) Fault Detector Properties: The FD process gets an
updated global view of all processes’ health at the end of
each ping cycle around all healthy processes. Thus, a failed
process is bound to be detected by the FD process in a finite
amount of time. The information about failed processes is then
given to all remaining healthy processes. Thus the FD process
satisfies the property of completeness. As a rare case, there can
be instances that (due to a network related problem) a healthy
process is not reachable by the FD process but is accessible by
some or all other processes. This will result in a false-positive
signal about a processes failure. Thus the property of accuracy
4(a) Ping based fault detection by FD
process
(b) FD detects failure of 6,7
processes and designates 1,2
as rescue processes
(c) The rescue processes (1,2)
join the worker group during
failure recovery stage
Figure 1: The working of the fault detector process. The
return value of ping is GASPI SUCCESS for all healthy
processes (a), whereas it returns with GASPI ERROR for
failed processes (b). After failure detection, FD informs all
processes about failed processes as well as their replacement
processes. A new worker group is then built with the help of
rescue processes (c).
is only loosely satisfied. A false-positive signal will lead the
application to undergo the failure recovery phase but it does
not affect the correctness of the program results.
b) Alternate investigated failure detection methods: We
also investigated the following failure detection mechanisms:
1) Ping-based all-to-all: In this method each process per-
forms periodic all-to-all pings to detect the failures.
2) Ping-based neighbor level: Each process ‘i’ periodically
pings only its neighboring process ‘i+1’. In case a failure
is detected at the neighbor level, a ping based all-to-all
operation is triggered on all processes to get a global
health view.
In both of these approaches, a potential deadlock can arise
in the cases where multiple processes detect different sets of
failed processes. Reaching a consensus about the identified
failures adds further complexity in the algorithm. Moreover an
all-to-all ping based approach is not a scalable failure detection
method and in failure free cases a certain amount of overhead
in both cases is introduced. In contrast, a dedicated FD process
with one-sided ping eliminates the potential deadlock situation
and causes negligible overhead in failure-free cases.
B. Communication reconstruction
The FD process propagates the list of failed processes and
the list of respective rescue processes to all worker and rescue
processes. The worker group is recreated in such a way that
the failed processes are left out and the rescue processes are
included. Figure 1b and 1c show the schematic of failure
/ / check f o r f a i l u r e acknowledgemen t s i g n a l
i f ( c h e c k f a i l e d p r o c l i s t ( f a i l e d p r o c l i s t ) == t r u e ){
boo l a m i r e s c u e p r o c = a m i r e s c u e p r o c e s s
( r e s c u e p r o c l i s t ) ;
i f ( a m i r e s c u e p r o c == t r u e ){
u p d a t e m y r a n k a c t i v e ( myrank ac t ive ,
gm myrank act ive ) ;
/ / r e s c u e p r o c e s s e s o v e r t a k e t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e
f a i l e d p r o c e s s e s
}
i f ( a m i r e s c u e p r o c == f a l s e ){
g a s p i g r o u p d e l e t e (COMM MAIN) ;
}
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i<n u m f a i l e d p r o c s ; ++ i ){
g a s p i p r o c k i l l ( f a i l e d p r o c l i s t [ i ] , GASPI BLOCK) ;
}
g a s p i g r o u p t COMM MAIN NEW;
g a s p i g r o u p c r e a t e (&COMM MAIN NEW) ;
g a s p i n u m b e r t g s i z e ;
r e f r e s h s t a t u s p r o c ( s t a t u s p r o c e s s e s ) ;
/ / s t a t u s p r o c e s s e s s t o r e s i n f o r m a t i o n abou t s t a t e o f
p r o c e s s e s ( working , f a i l e d or i d l e ) . A l s o managed by
FD p r o c e s s
f o r ( g a s p i n u m b e r t i = 0 ; i < numprocs ( ) ; i ++){
i f ( s t a t u s p r o c e s s e s [ i ]==WORKING){
g a s p i g r o u p a d d (COMM MAIN NEW, i ) ;
g a s p i g r o u p s i z e (COMM MAIN NEW, &g s i z e ) ;
i f ( g s i z e == numprocs working )
b r e a k ;
}
}
gas p i g roup commi t (COMM MAIN NEW, GASPI BLOCK) ;
COMM MAIN = COMM MAIN NEW;
r e i n i t d a t a s t u c t u r e r e a d C P ( ) ;
}
Listing 2: The reconstruction of the working group is
performed in case a failure is detected in the health check
routine.
acknowledgment and reconstruction of a working group after
failure. The steps involved in this recovery mechanism to form
a working group are shown in Listing 2. The cases of transient
failures and a false-positive detected failures are handled using
gaspi proc kill in the communication reconstruction phase. It
explicitly enforces the processes to die even if they were alive,
preventing them from further participation in the application.
C. Data Recovery: Neighbor node-level checkpoint/restart
We have utilized the classic application specific C/R tech-
nique for the purpose of data recovery in our application. Typ-
ically checkpoints are written to the parallel file system (PFS).
Writing and retrieving them from PFS is expensive. Therefore
we have implemented a library for GPI-2 to take checkpoints
at neighbor node-level. Figure 2 shows the schematic of an
application utilizing the library. At the init call from the
application, the library creates a thread which waits for a signal
from the application. At a checkpoint iteration, the application
first creates a checkpoint on its local node and signals the
library thread after completion. The library thread then copies
the local copy of the checkpoint to the neighboring nodes. For
a higher degree of reliability, the user can also opt to make
infrequent PFS-level copies of the checkpoints. Due to the
fault-tolerant nature of the algorithm, the neighboring node
of processes can change after failure recovery. This requires
the neighbor node-level C/R library to be fault aware as well.
After the reconstruction of the worker group, the C/R library
5Figure 2: Schematic of the interaction between application and
the neighbor node-level checkpointing library.
refreshes its list of neighboring processes based on the failed
processes list provided by the application thread.
D. Application flow
A flowchart of the modified algorithm is shown in Fig. 3.
At the start of the application, the processes are categorized
into working and idle processes. One of the idle processes
acts as an FD process, whereas the rest stay idle. The worker
processes form a worker group and perform computation. The
communication routines are checked for a failure acknowledg-
ment signal from the FD process. The FD process periodically
checks the global state of the processes. Upon detection
of failure(s), it informs all remaining processes which then
enter the recovery stage of the algorithm to reconstruct the
worker group and restart from a consistent checkpoint. The
FD process itself joins the worker group if no idle process is
further available.
The current scheme has following restrictions which we plan
to address in the future work.
1) The number of failures a program can sustain is equal
to the number of idle processes specified at the start of
the program.
2) The fault tolerance capability of a program ends if the
FD process becomes a worker or encounters a failure
itself.
3) Only those network failures can be detected that can be
uniformly seen by the effected processes as well as by
the FD process.
E. Fault Tolerance Overhead
Each of the fault tolerance techniques carries a certain
amount of overhead in terms of time and/or resources. Our
approach requires the allocation of some extra nodes for fall-
back scenarios, which is a resource overhead. The calculation
Figure 3: Algorithm flow-chart with spare processes that are
kicked-in in the main program in case of failures.
of the optimal number of extra nodes for a particular case
depends on several factors including job size, job duration,
the MTTF of the system, etc. and is out of scope for this
paper. In the following, we term overhead as the increase in
application run time due to its fault tolerance capabilities.
In principle, the fault detection with global ping messages is
an expensive operation. In our method, a FD process performs
one-sided pings to get the global health view. On the other
hand, the worker processes check for a failure acknowledg-
ment signal from the FD process before each communication
call. Thus, from the working processes’ standpoint, the failure
detection mechanism adds very little cost to the overall run-
time of the algorithm. As we shall see in Sect. VI, this cost
is negligible.
The first major overhead is introduced by checkpointing.
There can be two kinds of checkpoints: a global PFS-level
checkpoint, and a neighbor level checkpoint. In case of a
restart, the data is initialized from a consistent checkpoint. The
processes must redo the work, up to the point where the actual
failure happened. This is the source of the second overhead and
depends on the instance where the failure occurred between
two checkpoints.
In case of a failure, all processes go through the failure
detection and recovery stage of the program. This constitutes
the third form of overhead and can be decomposed into three
categories:
• Failure detection overhead/communication with failed
processes (OHF1): This is the time it takes for the FD
process to successfully detect and acknowledge the fail-
ures to other processes. Meanwhile, the healthy processes
trying to communicate with the failed processes end up
in timeout-based returns unless a failure acknowledgment
is received.
• Rebuilding of work group (OHF2): This step involves the
creation of a new worker group, replacing failed processes
(shown in Listing. 2). Due to the blocking nature of the
gaspi group commit() procedure, this overhead is non-
negligible.
6• Reinitialization of data (OHF3): After the new work group
is formed, the data structure gets initialized from the last
consistent checkpoint. If the checkpoint is not available
on the local node, it is fetched from the neighbor node
of the failed process by the checkpoint library.
In the next sections, we perform benchmarks and get a
quantitative notion of the above mentioned overheads in a
practical scenario.
V. EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK
We use the Lanczos algorithm to demonstrate the usage
of our fault tolerance technique. The Lanczos algorithm is an
iterative scheme to find eigenvalues of a sparse matrix. We use
it to find the low-lying eigenvalues of a test matrix. Listing 1
shows the pseudo-code of the algorithm. Each iteration calcu-
lates the new Lanczos vectors, α , and β . After obtaining the
α and β values of each iteration, the approximated minimum
eigenvalues are determined using the QL method and are
checked against a convergence criterion. The checkpointing
data consists of two consecutive Lanczos vectors, α , and β .
Algorithm 1 The Lanczos algorithm for finding eigenvalues
of a matrix A
for j:=1,2, ..., ConvergenceCriterion do
function LANCZOS-STEP
ω j ← Aν j
α j ← ω j.ν j
ω j ← ω j−α jν j −β jν j−1
β j+1 ←‖ω j‖
ν j+1 ← ω j/β j+1
end function
CalcMinimumEigenVal()
end for
For a parallel spMVM operation, the pre-processing stage
includes the setup of communication. In this stage, the sp-
MVM operation is divided into two parts, a local part for
which the process has right-hand vector values (RHS) locally
available, and a remote part for which the process needs to
fetch RHS values from other processes. In the pre-processing
stage, each process determines the indices of the RHS that it
needs from other processes. These indices are communicated
to the respective processes, who then write (via one-sided
GASPI communication) the RHS values of those indices
before every spMVM iteration.
In the fault tolerant version of the Lanczos algorithm, each
process writes a checkpoint after the pre-processing stage.
This checkpoint stores information relevant for communication
with other processes. After failure recovery, the rescue process
reads the checkpoint of the failed process. In this way, the
rescue process is informed about the communicating partners
and the respective RHS indices to communicate to other
processes. Every non-failing process also refreshes its list of
communication partners by replacing the rank of the failed
process with the new rescue process. Using this method, the
program can resume the computations after failure recov-
ery without having to perform the pre-processing step again
(which would add the overall cost of recovery).
In addition to the main Lanczos application, the underlying
spMVM library also needs to be prepared for fault tolerance.
Each blocking communication call in spMVM library now
performs a check for the failure acknowledgment signal. After
the processes detect a failure signal from the FD process, no
further communications are performed.
The matrix for our benchmark case arises from the quantum-
mechanical description of electron transport properties in
graphene. Graphene is a blueprint for quasi two-dimensional
materials with many interesting properties and prospective
applications in several fields of nanotechnology and nanoelec-
tronics. A matrix generation library tool is used to construct
the matrix on the fly. Depending upon the specified geometry
size, each process allocates its own chunk of the matrix. This
way, the expensive step of reading the matrix from PFS is
avoided.
Testbed: All tests were done on the LiMa cluster1 at
RRZE, whose nodes are equipped with two Intel Xeon 5650
“Westmere” chips with a base frequency of 2.66 GHz. Each
node has 24 GB of RAM (12 GB per NUMA domain). The
system has Mellanox QDR InfiniBand (IB) and GBit Ethernet
interconnects.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we test our benchmark application with
various runtime scenarios and compare their relative overhead.
We have varified the recovery mechanism by killing the
application processes in follwing three ways: i) Exiting the
processes using ‘exit(-1)’ within the program ii) Using ‘kill -
9 <process-id>’ iii) Physically introducing a network failure.
Turning off complete compute nodes was not done due to
limitations of the batch queuing system which would delete
the complete job owing to the dead node.
In the Lanczos algorithm, the stopping criterion depends on
finding a range of eigenvalues up to a certain accuracy. For
benchmarking purposes, we use a fixed number of iterations
(3500) as the stopping criterion. The neighbor-node level
checkpoints are taken at every 500th iteration. As discussed
in the previous section, the matrix checkpoint is only stored
once after its pre-processing stage at the start of the algorithm.
The periodic checkpoints consist of only Lanczos vectors and
the calculated eigenvalues up to the corresponding iteration.
The Graphene matrix consists of 1.2 ·108 rows and columns,
and 1.5 ·109 non-zeros. The global size of each checkpoint is
≈ 1.9 GBytes. The GASPI communication timeout value is set
to 1 second, after which the processes retry communication
unless a failure acknowledgement is recieved from the FD
process. Furthermore, the FD process performs the ping scan
on all processes every 3 seconds.
Figure 4 shows the runtime of the Lanczos benchmark on
256 nodes (256 processes, 12 threads/process) in several cases.
For this benchmark, the processes are killed using ‘exit(-1)’
at a specific iteration in order to have a deterministic redo-
work time. The application is started with four idle processes
(nodes) reserved for failure recovery. The first case represents
1LiMa cluster at the Erlangen Regional Computing Center (RRZE): http://
www.hpc.rrze.fau.de/systeme/lima-cluster.shtml
7w/o HC
w/o CP
 w/o HC
with CP
with HC
with CP
  1 fail
recovery
  2 fail
recovery
  3 fail
recovery
 3 sim. fail
  recovery
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
R
un
tim
e 
[s]
Computation time
Redo-work time
Re-initialize time
Fault detection time
Figure 4: Various runtime scenarios of Lanczos application on
256 nodes. Each failure recovery cost ≈ 17 seconds.
the application runtime where no health check is performed
and no checkpoints are taken (‘w/o HC, w/o CP’ bar). This
runtime marks the baseline case of our overhead study. The
neighbor-node level checkpoints add negligible overhead of
around 0.01% (‘w/o HC, with CP’ bar). Furthermore the
case of health check adds no additional overhead (‘with HC,
with CP’ bar). Significant overhead only appears in case of
failure recovery scenarios. Each failure adds approximately 64
seconds to the total runtime of the application. The average
failure detection takes ≈ 7 seconds on 256 nodes. The ‘re-
initialization’ overhead, which includes group reconstruction
and checkpoint reading causes ≈ 10 seconds on average. Thus
a failure detection and recovery costs up to around 17 seconds.
The redo-work time constitutes a major part of the total
overhead. The average time for redo-work is the time between
two successive checkpoints. Owing to a good checkpoint
strategy with very low overhead, the checkpoint frequency
can be increased which will lead to the reduction of redo-
work time. Recovery from more failures adds approximately
proportional overhead as shown in Fig. 4 with two and three
recovery case runtimes. In practice, a likely scenario is to
have multiple failures simultaneously (e.g., failure of a node
with multiple processes). Thus, we have used a threaded FD
process (with 8 threads) to check the state of more than one
process by monitoring one-sided pings in parallel on different
communication queues. This is highlighted in ‘3 sim. fail
recovery’ case, where three simultaneous failures are detected
with the overhead of one failure detection.
It is important to observe and analyse the scaling behavior
of a fault detection mechanism. Table I shows the ping scan
time of the FD process without any failure. The FD process
takes approximately 1ms to perform a ping with each healthy
process. The table also shows the failure detection and ac-
knowledgement time in case of a failure. For this benchmark,
one randomly selected process is terminated using ‘kill -9
<process-id>’ at a random instance during the application run.
The time is measured between the instance of fault injection
and the acknowledgement of failures by the processes. The
experiments show a good scalability of fault detection and
acknowledgement method upto 256 nodes. It is important to
Num. of Nodes 8 16 32 64 128 256
Avg. ping scan
time[s] 0.010 0.018 0.036 0.067 0.129 0.255
Failure
detection and
ack. time[s]
4.9
±0.7
5.3
±0.7
5.5
±0.8
4.3
±0.7
5.7
±1.2
5.3
±0.8
Table I: The average ping scan time of the FD process and the
failure detection time (and standard deviation using 10 runs)
with respect to the number of nodes.
mention that this time is the summation of the fault detecion
overhead OHF1 (as explained in previous section) as well as
the delay of 3 seconds between two ping scans.
VII. RELATED WORK
The prototype implementation of ULFM using OpenMPI
has produced similar work to ours in terms of failure recovery
strategies and/or performance evaluation.
Bland et al. have implemented a fault tolerant Monte Carlo
Communication Kernel proxy-app using ULFM in [16]. They
have demonstrated two recovery modes of the application, a
classic checkpoint/restart approach and an alternative solution
in which the critical data is stored on neighboring nodes after
each iteration. The recovery is done by spawning an additional
process which reads the data from the failed process’s neigh-
boring node. In [17], a different approach of data recovery
is implemented to develop a fault tolerant Multi-Level Monte
Carlo based application using ULFM. The data from failed
processes are altogether discarded and only survivors’ data
is used to complete the application further. Depending on the
number of failures, the estimation error deteriorates the quality
of results. A similar strategy was pursued by Ali et al. to de-
velop a 2D PDE solver in [18]. They compare three alternative
data recovery approaches based on C/R and approximation
techniques. All mentioned studies have found ULFM to have
acceptable overhead for failure recovery. In [15], Laguna et
al. have conducted a broad and critical evaluation of ULFM.
They have first discussed preferable recovery modes based
on the nature of the applications and then performed a case
study on a ULFM-based implementation of a fault-tolerant
molecular dynamics application (ddcMD). They have found
the time of revoking and shrinking the communicator to be
increasing linearly with increasing number of nodes. In the
end, they have suggested improvements to ULFM to make it
an attractive option for application developers.
The ULFM studies are based on the detection of faults by
communication failure between processes. No explicit failure
detection methods are used. In [19], K. Kharbas et al. have
evaluated two kinds of fault detector mechanisms for MPI
applications based on periodic and sporadic probing. The
probing is based on ping-pong style messaging. They have
only reported the overhead for failure-free cases which ranges
from 1% to 21%, averaging around 10% for NAS-parallel
benchmarks. The fault detector overhead is negligible when
separate background processes are used to check failures on
the same set of nodes and the main application. In this case
the background processes use Gigabit Ethernet instead of the
8Infiniband network used by the application, but this is not
a suitable design as a large category of faults are network
related. They conclude that a separate periodic fault detection
mechanism is a superior method as compared to an sporadic
approach.
VIII. SUMMARY
We have implemented a fault-tolerant version of a parallel
Lanczos algorithm using the GPI-2 communication library
with custom extensions. An explicit failure detector (FD)
was designed to monitor the health of all processes. The
FD process performs periodic one-sided pings to monitor the
health state of all processes. We have used the idea of spare
processes in combination with a checkpoint/restart mechanism
for the replacement of failed processes. One of these spare
processes is designated to be the FD process, whereas the
rest stays idle until a failure occurs and they join the worker
processes. The efficiency of checkpoints is optimized by using
a neighbor node-level checkpoint/restart library which is also
fault tolerance aware.
The benchmark performed on 256 nodes show that having
an explicit FD causes no overhead to the working processes.
The recovery from a single failure causes a total overhead
of around 64 seconds, a large part which comes from the
redo-work time. The failure detection itself takes ≈7 sec-
onds, whereas the communication reconstruction and data
re-initialization from the checkpoint add ≈10 seconds of
overhead. Each additional failure adds similar cost. On the
other hand, if multiple failures happen simultaneously (likely
scenario for node failures), they have the potential to be
detected at the cost of a single failure. Our failure detection
mechanism shows good scaling behaviour on the scaling test
performed up to 256 nodes.
Discussion and Future work: The fault tolerance research
is in its infancy stages regarding application-driven fault tol-
erance. Only having FT communication is not nearly enough.
Many other components are needed to build an FT application
in its true sense, e.g., failure information propagation to
healthy processes, communication reconstruction after failure,
data recovery method, etc. These add extra burden in terms of
application development.
More fault tolerance related functionalies can be included
within or on top of the GASPI framework in order to simplify
the development of fault tolerant codes. These include failed
processes acknowledgment by groups, the replacement of
failed processes by a newly spawned ones, etc. Furthermore,
functionality can be provided to assign the identity of the failed
process to the newly spawned/replaced process.
Our future work is targeted to remove the current limitations
of our approach and making the technique more general and
user friendly. The redundancy approach can be implemented
to make the FD process fault tolerant. We also plan to compare
this fault tolerance approach with the Open MPI’s ULFM
functionality.
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